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NETWORK; JOHN W. PAUL; BART METZGER; 
CHRISTOPHER T. OLIVIA; JOHN LASKY;  
CANONSBURG GENERAL HOSPITAL 
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      SENORA TARPLEY; KATIEJO BIGENHO; WAYNE 
HABER,  
      on their own behalf and on behalf of all  
other opt-in plaintiffs, 
                              Appellants  
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-13-cv-01449 
District Judge: The Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
______________ 
 
Argued September 28, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH,* and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:   November 18, 2016)                      
 
David S. Fryman (Argued) 
Elizabeth K. McManus 
Ballard Spahr 
1735 Market Street 
51st Floor 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
                                              
* Honorable D. Brooks Smith, United States Circuit Judge for 
the Third Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on October 1, 
2016. 
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Jonathan W. Ferris 
J. Nelson Thomas (Argued) 
Thomas & Solomon 
693 East Avenue 
Rochester, NY  14607 
 Counsel for Appellant 
         
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 
 Appellants are three hospital employees who claim 
they were not properly compensated for work performed 
during meal breaks.  They seek review of a District Court’s 
decision that declined to permit a civil case in which they 
wished to participate to continue as a collective action under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(b).   
 This is the second decertification-related appeal in a 
series of four similar FLSA cases filed in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania.  We dismissed the first appeal, which 
consolidated two of the District Court proceedings, for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction and mootness.  Camesi v. University of 
Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Appellants in the current appeal candidly acknowledge that 
they are before us in an effort to correct the procedural flaws 
that prevented us from reaching the merits of the 
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decertification decision in the first appeal.  Despite their 
efforts, Appellants fare no better this time around.  We will 
dismiss this appeal. 
I. 
A. 
 The first round of litigation began in 2009 when two 
groups of plaintiffs filed  separate but similar complaints 
against two large Western Pennsylvania hospitals and their 
affiliated health care facilities and centers: Camesi v. 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, No. 3:09-cv-00085 
(W.D. Pa.), and Kuznyetsov v. West Penn Allegheny Health 
System, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00379 (W.D. Pa.) (later 
consolidated into No. 2:10-cv-00948 (W.D. Pa.)).  The 
complaints alleged that the hospital defendants violated the 
FLSA by failing to properly pay their employees for work 
performed during scheduled meal breaks.  The named 
plaintiffs purported to bring the claims as collective actions 
on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated 
employees pursuant to FLSA § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).1  
                                              
1 The complaints also raised class action claims pursuant to 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and claims 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964.  
The ERISA and RICO claims were dismissed with prejudice.  
No Rule 23 class was certified, nor were those dismissals 
challenged in the earlier appeal. 
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 District Judge Cathy Bissoon conditionally certified 
the collective action in Camesi on May 14, 2009, and District 
Judge Donetta Ambrose conditionally certified the collective 
action in Kuznyetsov on June 1, 2009.  Both judges approved 
detailed notices to be sent to potential collective action 
members.  Among other things, the notices advised that, by 
consenting to opt in to the suit, an employee would “[j]oin in 
this lawsuit,” “[a]wait the outcome,” and “[g]ive up the right 
to sue separately.”  The notices further provided that “[o]nce 
people have had the chance to opt in, the Court will decide 
whether people who have opted in may participate in this 
collective action.  Only people ‘similarly situated’ to the 
plaintiffs may participate in this collective action.” 
 A consent form accompanied the court-approved 
notices in Camesi and Kuznyetsov.  The consent form 
indicated, among other things, that “[u]nless I opt to retain 
separate counsel of my own choice and at my own expense, I 
hereby . . . authorize the named plaintiffs to make decisions 
on my behalf concerning the litigation, the method and 
manner of conducting this litigation, and all other matters 
pertaining to this lawsuit, including any settlement. . . . .”  
Using those forms, more than 3,000 individuals consented to 
opt in to the Camesi collective action and more than 800 
consented to opt in to the Kuznyetzov collective action.2 
                                              
2 Among the many Kuznyetsov opt-in plaintiff consent forms 
are those of individuals who will soon re-appear as 
participants in the next round of district court litigation, see 
infra, including Steven Halle, Wayne Haber, and KatieJo 
Bigenho.  It appears Senora Tarpley is the sole participant in 
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 The parties conducted collective action related 
discovery for nearly two years, including expert discovery 
and fact discovery of the named plaintiffs and a sample of the 
collective action members.  The District Judges then 
entertained cross-motions by the plaintiffs to certify the 
collective actions and by the defendants to decertify the 
collective actions.   
 Both judges decertified the collective actions.  In her 
opinion decertifying Kuznyetsov, Judge Ambrose described 
the basic factual allegations of the claim as follows: 
Defendants require Plaintiffs to take daily, 
uncompensated meal breaks.  To accomplish 
this, Defendants adopted a computerized 
timekeeping system, called Kronos, that 
automatically deducts a thirty minute meal 
period from nonexempt employees’ time 
records when an employee has worked a shift of 
more than five or six hours.  If an employee is 
unable to take an uninterrupted thirty minute 
meal break, the entire thirty minute automatic 
deduction may be canceled so that the employee 
is paid for the entire meal break.  The manner in 
which the deduction is cancelled, however, 
varied by location, department, shift, and 
supervisor. 
                                                                                                     
the current appeal who did not consent to opt in to 
Kuznyetsov. 
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Kuznyetsov, No. 2:10-cv-00948, 2011 WL 6372852, at *1 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011).  Judge Ambrose then concluded 
that the plaintiffs’ job duties varied significantly from one 
individual to the next, and that those job duties were “highly 
relevant in terms of how, why and whether the employees 
were compensated properly for missed or interrupted meal 
breaks.”  Id. at *5.  In addition, more than 300 different 
individuals supervised the plaintiffs, the supervisors had 
individual authority to implement policies as to the meal 
deduction, and the supervisors’ practices varied in this regard.  
Id.  Finally, Judge Ambrose agreed with the defendants’ 
argument that they would need to present individualized 
defenses to establish whether the FLSA was violated as to 
each plaintiff, which “could not be generalized among the 
824 plaintiffs.”  Id. at *6.  Judge Bissoon reached similar 
conclusions in Camesi.  See Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh 
Med. Ctr., No. 09-85J, 2011 WL 6372873 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 
2011). 
 Thus, both judges concluded that the opt-in plaintiffs 
were not “similarly situated” to the named plaintiffs.  When 
they decertified the two collective actions, the judges also 
dismissed the claims of all opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice 
to re-filing individual actions.  
B. 
 In an express effort to seek immediate appellate review 
of the decertification orders, the named plaintiffs in both 
Camesi and Kuznyetsov moved to voluntarily dismiss their 
claims with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The two district judges granted the 
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motions and the named plaintiffs promptly filed notices of 
appeal.  This court consolidated the two appeals.  In Camesi 
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2013), 
we dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. 
 First, we determined that a decertification order, like a 
class certification order in the Rule 23 context, is an 
interlocutory order that is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Id. at 245.  Then, relying on our class action decision 
in Sullivan v. Pac. Indem. Co., 566 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1977), 
which we found to be controlling, we determined that the 
named plaintiffs in Camesi and Kuznyetsov improperly had 
attempted to short-circuit the procedure for appealing an 
interlocutory order that is separate from, and unrelated to, the 
merits of their case.  Camesi, 729 F.3d at 245.  We explained 
that the named plaintiffs could have obtained appellate review 
of the decertification decision by proceeding to a final 
judgment on the merits of their individual claims or, in the 
alternative, by seeking permission to certify an interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Instead, plaintiffs 
attempted to manufacture finality through a voluntary 
dismissal of their cases.  We rejected this “procedural sleight-
of-hand.”  Id. 
 We further determined that, by voluntarily dismissing 
their claims with prejudice, the named plaintiffs mooted their 
claims in Camesi and Kuznyetsov.  Id. at 247.  In doing so, the 
named plaintiffs extinguished any residual representational 
interest they may once have had in bringing claims on behalf 
of individuals who had filed consents to opt in to the 
collective action.  Id.  We did not then address the more 
difficult question of whether, when individuals have opted in 
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to a collective action following conditional certification, a 
plaintiff who has filed the collective action may retain a 
justiciable interest in the litigation based only upon his or her 
representative capacity.  Instead, we concluded that, in the 
specific circumstance of a voluntary dismissal, “it would be 
anomalous to conclude that [the Camesi/Kuznyetsov] 
Appellants are ‘similarly situated’ to opt-in plaintiffs who, 
unlike Appellants, have actually retained their individual 
claims.  Without any personal stake in the matter, [the 
Camesi/Kuznyetsov] Appellants should not be permitted to 
represent opt-in plaintiffs.”  Id. 
 We therefore dismissed Camesi for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
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C. 
 Soon after we issued our Camesi opinion, the next 
round of district court litigation began.  The same law firm 
that represented the Camesi/Kuznyetsov plaintiffs filed two 
new FLSA collective action complaints on behalf of two new 
sets of named plaintiffs against the same hospital defendants, 
raising substantially the same FLSA claims concerning work 
during unpaid meal breaks.  The new complaints proposed 
slightly different definitions of the collective actions than had 
been proposed in Camesi and Kuznyetsov.  The follow-up to 
Camesi was Belle v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., No. 2:13-
cv-01448 (W.D. Pa.), while the follow-up to Kuznyetsov was 
Halle v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., No. 2:13-cv-01449 
(W.D. Pa.).  Both cases were assigned to Judge Bissoon, who 
had presided over Camesi.   
 In Belle, before the named plaintiffs filed a motion to 
conditionally certify a collective action, more than 900 
individuals filed consents to opt in.  The defendants moved to 
dismiss the collective action allegations on grounds of issue 
preclusion, arguing that the issue of certification of the 
collective action had been fully litigated in Camesi and 
should not be relitigated in Belle.   
 Judge Bissoon agreed.  By order dated September 29, 
2014, she concluded that, despite minor “tweak[s],” Belle was 
a “redux” of Camesi in which the “theories of liability 
remain[ed] materially unchanged.”  Belle, No. 2:13-cv-01448, 
2014 WL 4828899 at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2014).  She 
therefore queried whether it would be proper to allow the 
Camesi opt-ins to re-litigate the unfavorable decertification 
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ruling in Camesi through a new lawsuit.  She concluded, 
invoking the doctrine of issue preclusion, that “[t]he answer 
to this question is, resoundingly, ‘no.’”  Id.   
 Specifically, Judge Bissoon determined that issue 
preclusion applied because decertification already had been 
litigated in Camesi, the decision in Camesi was sufficiently 
final for purposes of issue preclusion, and all the named 
plaintiffs in Belle had opted in to Camesi and thus had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.3  Accordingly, she 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, struck the 
collective action allegations from the complaint, and 
dismissed the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice 
to re-filing individual complaints.  The named Belle plaintiffs 
subsequently accepted offers of judgment under Rule 68 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  No appeal followed. 
 As in Belle, numerous individuals (more than 250) 
filed consents to opt in to Halle before Judge Bissoon had an 
opportunity to address whether a collective action should be 
conditionally certified.  Also as in Belle, the defendants filed 
a motion to dismiss the collective action allegations on the 
ground of issue preclusion.  On November 6, 2014, Judge 
Bissoon granted the motion, incorporating by reference her 
opinion on issue preclusion in Belle.  See Halle v. W. Penn 
                                              
3 Judge Bissoon also observed that, although a “scant 
number” of Belle opt-ins had not participated in Camesi (less 
than 5% of them), principles of privity would extend the issue 
preclusion bar to those in Belle who had not opted in to 
Camesi. 
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Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., No. 2:13-cv-1449-CB (W.D. Pa. 
filed Nov. 6, 2014).4   
 On July 27, 2015, the sole named plaintiff in Halle, 
Steven Halle, accepted an offer of judgment from West Penn 
under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 
amount of $2,392.00 for back pay and liquidated damages.  
Consistent with the terms of Halle’s acceptance, Judge 
Bissoon entered judgment against West Penn, dismissed 
Halle’s claims against the remaining defendants with 
prejudice, and administratively closed the case.   
 Then, three of the Halle opt-in plaintiffs – Senora 
Tarpley, KatieJo Bigenho, and Wayne Haber – filed this 
appeal.  Steven Halle did not appeal and is not participating in 
this appeal. 
II. 
 Before turning to the matter before us, we consider a 
fundamental question arising from the procedural history of 
this case: just what is a “collective action”5 under the FLSA?   
                                              
4 Judge Bissoon observed that the “overlap” between 
Kuznyetsov and Halle was less than in Camesi/Belle (just less 
than 81%, as opposed to slightly more than 95%), but 
concluded “this distinction does not modify the Court’s 
analyses and conclusions.”  Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny 
Health Sys. Inc., No. 2:13-cv-1449-CB, slip op. at 1 n.1 
(W.D. Pa. filed Nov. 6, 2014). 
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 To answer this question, we first look to the relevant 
portion of the FLSA, which provides that an action may be 
brought “by any one or more employees for and in behalf of 
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated” 
and that “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such 
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a 
party and such consent is filed in the court in which such 
action is brought.”  29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  This language raises 
more questions than it provides answers.  While the first 
sentence sounds in  representational terms (to proceed “in 
behalf of” others “similarly situated”), the second sentence 
refers to those who file consents as “party plaintiffs,” seeming 
to imply that all who affirmatively choose to become 
participants have an equal, individual stake in the proceeding.   
 Congress has not acted to shed light on any of these 
provisions.  Since the statute was enacted in its current form 
in 1947,6 Congress has provided no framework setting forth 
how and when it is to be determined whether employees are 
“similarly situated,” the significance of “party plaintiff” 
status, or – most relevant to the parties here –who may appeal 
                                                                                                     
5 Although the statute does not employ the phrase “collective 
action,” the term appears in the FLSA’s legislative history, 
see H.R. Rep. No. 80-326, at 13 (1947) (Conf. Rep.), and is 
accepted as the appropriate designation for the type of 
representative action described in FLSA § 216(b). 
6 Further, Congress added the “opt-in” provision, setting forth 
that “no employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing. . . .”  See H.R. Rep. 
No. 80-326, at 13 (1947) (Conf. Rep.). 
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a collective action determination and when that appeal may 
be taken.  Nor have procedural rules been promulgated to 
guide courts and parties in processing collective actions.  As a 
result, courts have been left to consider these matters when 
they arise, frequently borrowing or adapting procedures, 
concepts, and nomenclature from the Rule 23 class action 
context, while recognizing that there remain important 
differences between a Rule 23 class action and a collective 
action.  Compare 7B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1807 (3d ed. 2016) 
(“[C]ollective actions behave in many ways like Rule 23 class 
actions . . . .”) with Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 
S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013) (distinguishing class action cases 
because “Rule 23 class actions are fundamentally different 
from collective actions under the FLSA . . .” (citation 
omitted)); see also, e.g., Cameron-Grant v. Maxim 
Healthcare Svcs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(“[Section] 216(b) is a fundamentally different creature than 
the Rule 23 class action.”).  Indeed, we have recognized an 
unfortunate side effect of the often blurred lines between the 
two types of proceedings: “expedient adoption of Rule 23 
terminology with no mooring in the statutory text of § 216(b) 
may have injected a measure of confusion into the wider body 
of FLSA jurisprudence.”  Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare 
Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d on other 
grounds by 133 S. Ct. 1523.  
 To focus, then, on what a collective action is and is 
not, we first observe the unremarkable fact that an FLSA 
collective action is a form of group litigation in which a 
named employee plaintiff or plaintiffs file a complaint “in 
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behalf of” a group of other, initially unnamed employees who 
purport to be “similarly situated” to the named plaintiff.  
Thus, via § 216(b), the FLSA provides a vehicle for 
managing claims of multiple employees against a single 
employer.  By permitting employees to proceed collectively, 
the FLSA provides employees the advantages of pooling 
resources and lowering individual costs so that those with 
relatively small claims may pursue relief where individual 
litigation might otherwise be cost-prohibitive.  It also yields 
efficiencies for the judicial system through resolution in one 
proceeding of common issues arising from the same allegedly 
wrongful activity affecting numerous individuals.  See 
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 
(1989); see also 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on 
Class Actions § 2:16 (12th ed. 2015) (“The purpose of a 
collective action under the FLSA is to allow plaintiffs to 
minimize individual expense in pursuing wage rights through 
pooled resources and to benefit the judicial system through 
unitary resolution of common legal and factual issues arising 
from the same conduct.”). 
 When a named plaintiff files a complaint containing 
FLSA collective action allegations, the mere presence of the 
allegations does not automatically give rise to the kind of 
aggregate litigation provided for in Rule 23.  Rather, the 
existence of a collective action depends upon the affirmative 
participation of opt-in plaintiffs.  See Smith v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan v. Family 
Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008).  
Courts are then called upon to decide whether those who 
purport to join the collective action are “similarly situated” as 
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intended by the statute.  Because there are no formal 
procedural rules that mandate how to accomplish this task, 
courts have developed a practical approach to managing 
FLSA collective actions.  This approach, which has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court and is widely accepted in 
most jurisdictions, is a two-step certification process.7  See 
Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 1530; Zavala v. Wal Mart 
Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 The first step, so-called conditional certification, 
requires a named plaintiff to make a “modest factual 
showing” – something beyond mere speculation – to 
demonstrate a factual nexus between the manner in which the 
employer’s alleged policy affected him or her and the manner 
in which it affected the proposed collective action members.  
Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536 n. 4.  The “sole consequence” of 
conditional certification is the dissemination of court-
approved notice to potential collective action members.  
Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 1530.  Conditional 
certification, therefore, is not a true certification, but rather an 
exercise of a district court’s discretionary authority to oversee 
                                              
7 A minority of courts has rejected the two-step certification 
approach in favor of a more traditional Rule 23-style analysis, 
considering numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation.  See 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, 
McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2:16 & n.74 (13th ed. 2013).  
We rejected that approach in Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 
691 F.3d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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and facilitate the notice process.  Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536 
(citing Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989)8). 
 While conditional certification is discretionary, the 
Supreme Court has recognized its importance.  A district 
court’s early intervention in the preparation and distribution 
of notice to potential participants serves legitimate purposes, 
including avoidance of a multiplicity of duplicative suits and 
establishing cut-off dates to expedite disposition of the action.  
Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 171-72.  Nevertheless, 
“[w]hatever significance ‘conditional certification’ may have 
in § 216(b) proceedings, it is not tantamount to class 
certification under Rule 23.”  Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1532. 
 A denial at the conditional certification stage is not 
necessarily a final determination of whether the matter may 
proceed as a collective action.  Some courts permit the issue 
to be revisited after discovery or efforts by the named 
plaintiff to re-define the contours of the proposed collective 
action.  See, e.g., Bamgbose v. Delta-T Group, Inc., 724 F. 
Supp. 2d 510, 514 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (motion for conditional 
certification denied without prejudice, to be revisited after 
discovery for possibility of developing “subclasses’); see also 
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1807 (“If conditional certification 
is denied, the court may allow discovery to provide plaintiffs 
                                              
8 Although Hoffman-La Roche arose in the context of a 
proceeding under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, the ADEA incorporates 
enforcement provisions of the FLSA, including the collective 
action provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
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a second opportunity to obtain sufficient evidence of a 
collective to warrant conditional certification and the notice 
to opt in.”). 
 Generally, after conditional certification has been 
granted (although not always, given the discretionary nature 
of the first stage), individuals file notices providing their 
written consent to participate in the collective action pursuant 
to § 216(b).9  As in Kuznyetsov and Halle, the notices may 
indicate that the opt-in plaintiffs consent to having the named 
plaintiffs litigate, on their behalf, the FLSA claims.  See, e.g., 
Prickett v. DeKalb County, 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 
                                              
9 Some courts refer to the process of opting in to a collective 
action as “joinder.”  See Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 
1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996) (Garth, J.) (referring to a 
certification of an ADEA collective action as “permitting opt-
in joinder of ‘similarly situated’ plaintiffs”).  But opt-in 
plaintiffs are held to a lesser standard than FLSA named 
plaintiffs or other plaintiffs who join in civil actions.  For 
instance, ADEA opt-in plaintiffs do not need to exhaust 
administrative remedies, while ADEA named plaintiffs do.  
See Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1078 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(recognizing that “in other contexts the opt-in class action has 
been analogized to permissive joinder and intervention” but 
concluding that opt-ins in ADEA suit need not satisfy 
exhaustion requirements where named plaintiffs have done 
so).  Moreover, opt-in plaintiffs are held to a less stringent 
standard than under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  See Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1096-97. 
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2003) (“The consent given was for the named plaintiffs to 
represent the interests of the employee in adjudicating all 
claims that the employee had under the FLSA.”). 
 This “opt-in” requirement – mandating that each 
individual must file an affirmative consent to join the 
collective action – is the most conspicuous difference 
between the FLSA collective action device and a class action 
under Rule 23.  See De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 
F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2003).  “This difference means that 
every plaintiff who opts in to a collective action has party 
status, whereas unnamed class members in Rule 23 class 
actions do not.”  Wright & Miller, supra, § 1807; see also 
Prickett, 349 F.3d at 1297 (“[B]y referring to them as ‘party 
plaintiff[s],’ Congress indicated that opt-in plaintiffs should 
have the same status in relation to the claims of the lawsuit as 
the named plaintiffs.”).  This prompts the as-yet unanswered 
question of what “party status” means in a collective action, 
particularly before a district court has considered whether 
those who have filed consent forms are in fact “similarly 
situated” to the named plaintiff for purposes of § 216(b).10 
                                              
10 Notably, § 216(b) is written in the negative, providing that 
“[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party 
and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is 
brought.”  Thus, the statute establishes that it is, at a 
minimum, necessary to file a written consent in order to 
become a party-plaintiff, but it is silent as to whether filing 
such a consent, without more, is sufficient to confer that 
status. 
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 Also after a grant of conditional certification, the 
parties conduct certification-related discovery, as they did in 
Camesi and Kuznyetsov.  Initial discovery may include efforts 
by the named plaintiffs to obtain employee contact 
information for purposes of notifying potential collective 
action members of the pending matter.  Once opt-in consents 
have been filed, discovery typically moves forward to assess 
whether the opt-ins are “similarly situated” to the named 
plaintiffs.  Frequently, this discovery focuses on the named 
plaintiffs and a subset of the collective group.  In Camesi, for 
instance, the parties agreed to conduct discovery regarding 75 
current and former employees to be chosen by the defendants, 
including 10 depositions and the completion of written 
questionnaires.  Camesi, No. 3:09-cv-00085, 2011 WL 
6372873 at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011).  Similarly, in 
Kuznyetsov the parties conducted discovery as to “18 sample 
Plaintiffs.”  Kuznyetsov, 2011 WL 6372852 at * 4.  See also, 
e.g., Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 967 (3d Cir. 
1992) (in ADEA collective action, parties randomly selected 
51 out of the 1,312 conditional collective action members for 
discovery to determine whether all opt-ins were similarly 
situated to the named plaintiffs).  Upon conclusion of 
discovery, the parties will file motions seeking final 
certification or decertification of the collective action. 
 At this stage, known as final certification, the named 
plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the opt-in plaintiffs 
are “similarly situated” to them for FLSA purposes.  Zavala, 
691 F.3d at 537; see also Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
765 F.3d 791, 801 (8th Cir. 2014) aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1036 
(2016); O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enter., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 
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584 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by 
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016).  
“Being ‘similarly situated’ . . . means that one is subjected to 
some common employer practice that, if proved, would help 
demonstrate a violation of the FLSA.”  Zavala, 691 F.3d at 
538. 
 Courts will consider a variety of factors in reaching 
this determination.  “These include the factual and 
employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, the different 
defenses to which the plaintiffs may be subject on an 
individual basis, the degree of fairness and procedural impact 
of certifying the action as a collective action, and whether 
plaintiffs have made the appropriate filings with the EEOC.”  
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1807.  Our Court endorses an ad 
hoc approach to this analysis, considering all relevant factors 
and making a determination on a case-by-case basis as to 
whether the named plaintiffs have satisfied this burden by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536-37. 
 If a collective action is decertified at the final stage, 
the matter will proceed as in Camesi and Kuznyetzov: the 
court will decertify the class, dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs 
without prejudice, and permit the named plaintiffs to proceed 
to trial.11  See Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1079 (3d 
                                              
11 While a dismissed opt-in plaintiff retains the ability to 
pursue individual claims after a district court decertifies a 
collective action, we have located no authority (nor have the 
parties cited any) discussing the approach taken by Steven 
Halle in the underlying case here – namely, his decision, upon 
dismissal without prejudice from Kuznyetsov, to re-file not 
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Cir. 1988) (“A district court has no power or jurisdiction to 
rule on the merits of the claims of individual [opt-in] 
members of a putative opt-in class when it denies 
certification.”); see also Wright & Miller, supra, § 1807.  If, 
however, final certification is granted, “the action proceeds to 
trial on a representative basis.”  Id.  As previously discussed, 
a decision on certification of a collective action is 
interlocutory and therefore not immediately appealable 
pursuant to § 1291.  Camesi, 729 F.3d at 245. 
                                                                                                     
only his individual claims, but also to try to resurrect 
substantially similar collective action allegations. 
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III. 
 With this understanding of the FLSA collective action 
device, we turn to the appeal before us.  The District Court 
exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review “final 
decisions” of district courts.  Giles v. Campbell, 698 F.3d 
153, 157 (3d Cir. 2012).  A final decision is one that “ends 
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment.”  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (quoting Catlin v. United 
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).  Although the parties did 
not raise the issue, we must satisfy ourselves of our 
jurisdiction over this appeal.12  See Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. 
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 In the end, Appellants, three opt-in plaintiffs, were 
dismissed without prejudice from Halle’s case and lost no 
substantive or procedural rights.  Therefore, they have no 
final order from which to appeal.  This conclusion is 
reinforced both by the language of their opt-in consent forms, 
which handed over all litigation authority to named plaintiff 
Steven Halle, and by the opt-in plaintiffs’ passive role in the 
suit.  While it may seem unfair to require the opt-in plaintiffs 
either to litigate a case to conclusion or certify an 
interlocutory appeal, finality – not unsupported assertions 
about fairness – defines our court’s jurisdiction. 
                                              
12 Because the parties’ briefs give rise to doubts concerning 
our ability to exercise appellate jurisdiction, we directed the 
parties to file supplemental briefs on this issue. 
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A. 
 Appellants seek review of Judge Bissoon’s order dated 
November 6, 2014.  That order had two important effects: it 
dismissed Steven Halle’s collective action allegations with 
prejudice on the ground of issue preclusion, and it also 
dismissed13 the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without 
prejudice to re-filing individual actions.  Neither of these 
aspects of Judge Bissoon’s order constitutes a final, 
appealable decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 The dismissal of the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims without 
prejudice is not a final decision for purposes of § 1291.  All 
opt-in plaintiffs may pursue their FLSA claims.  “Typically a 
dismissal without prejudice is not a final decision because the 
plaintiff may refile the complaint, thereby creating the risk of 
‘piecemeal’ appellate litigation.”  S.B. v. Kindercare Learning 
Ctrs., LLC, 815 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Borelli 
v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(“Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without 
prejudice is neither final nor appealable because the 
deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting 
the cause of action.”).  The November 6, 2014 order does not 
resolve any of the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims on the merits and 
acknowledges that those individuals remain free to file their 
own FLSA actions. 
                                              
13 Although the order states that the opt-in claims were 
“denied,” a denial implies a decision on the merits of the 
claim.  Because Judge Bissoon did not reach the merits of the 
opt-in plaintiffs’ claims, for clarity we refer to the claims as 
dismissed. 
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 In addition, the dismissal of Halle’s collective action 
allegations is not a final, appealable decision under § 1291.  
Although that decision arose in the context of a motion to 
dismiss rather than a motion to decertify, it results in a 
complaint that no longer alleges a collective action.  Our 
decision in Camesi therefore controls:  such an order is 
interlocutory and does not provide a basis for an immediate 
appeal under § 1291.14  Camesi, 729 F.3d at 245; see also, 
e.g., In re: Complaint of Ingram Barge Co., 517 F.3d 246, 
247 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that the court did 
not have appellate jurisdiction under § 1291 or § 1292(a)(3) 
because the district court’s order striking class action 
allegations did not settle parties’ rights).  Because the 
decertification is separate from, and unrelated to, the merits of 
Halle’s individual case, in the absence of a district court order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) permitting an immediate appeal 
(which Halle did not request and which Judge Bissoon 
therefore did not grant), appellate review of this interlocutory 
decertification decision is available by proceeding to a final 
judgment on the merits of Halle’s individual claims.  See 
Camesi, 729 F.3d at 245.   
                                              
14 Similarly, in the context of class actions, prior to the 1998 
amendments to Rule 23(f) that today permit parties to pursue 
immediate review of certification decisions, decisions 
decertifying a class had to await review until the plaintiff 
obtained a final judgment in the case – even if proceeding as 
an individual rather than as part of a larger group might mean 
the “death knell” for the action.  Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978). 
26 
 
 Appellants concede that the November 6 order was not 
appealable when Judge Bissoon entered it, and they did not 
appeal at that time.  Instead, they waited to appeal until after 
Steven Halle accepted West Penn’s offer of judgment in full 
satisfaction of his individual claims. 
B. 
 On July 27, 2015, Judge Bissoon entered judgment 
consistent with Halle’s acceptance of West Penn’s offer of 
judgment, dismissed Halle’s remaining claims against the 
other defendants with prejudice, and administratively closed 
the case.  This, Appellants argue, constitutes a final decision 
for purposes of § 1291, and, for appeal purposes, merges with 
all prior decisions in the case, including the November 6, 
2014, decertification decision.  See In re: Westinghouse Sec. 
Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under the ‘merger 
rule,’ prior interlocutory orders merge with the final judgment 
in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that they 
affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from 
the final order.” (citations omitted)). 
 West Penn argues that Halle’s acceptance of an offer 
of judgment operates like the voluntary dismissal in Camesi: 
it moots Halle’s personal claims and extinguishes his 
representational interest in proceeding on behalf of the opt-in 
plaintiffs. While this area of the law is “in a state of flux,” 
Camesi, 729 F.3d at 247,15 we need not reach that issue 
                                              
15 Compare U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 
400 (1980) (holding that, in the Rule 23 class action context, 
named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even 
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because Halle did not file this appeal.  Instead, in some 
procedural gymnastics apparently aimed at avoiding the 
mootness issue, three opt-in plaintiffs – Senora Tarpley, 
KatieJo Bigenho, and Wayne Haber – filed this appeal on 
behalf of themselves and “all other opt-in plaintiffs whose 
claims were dismissed.” 
C. 
 We must, therefore, consider whether Appellants 
retained a stake in Steven Halle’s ongoing individual case 
such that they are entitled to pursue an appeal as of right at its 
conclusion, after Halle’s individual claims have become 
                                                                                                     
if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the 
entry of judgment), with Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 
1529 (distinguishing Geraghty to hold that, prior to any 
individuals opting in, mooting the named plaintiff’s claims 
moots the entire suit); Cameron-Grant, 347 F.3d at 1249 
(“[A] § 216(b) plaintiff . . . presents only a claim on the 
merits . . . [and] has no claim that he is entitled to represent 
other plaintiffs.”); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d at 974 
(comparing collective actions to class actions and observing 
that “[n]ormally, when claims of the named plaintiffs become 
moot before class certification, dismissal of the action is 
required”); Smith v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1123 
(9th Cir. 2009) (“Because the plaintiffs voluntarily settled all 
of their claims after the district court’s denial of certification, 
they have failed to retain a personal stake in the litigation and 
their case is moot.”). 
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moot.16  We conclude that, for purposes of appeal, Appellants 
were no longer “parties” to the case after they were dismissed 
without prejudice from Halle’s proceeding.  See Devlin v. 
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2002) (an appeal of a class 
action settlement by an unnamed class member does not raise 
concerns of standing, but rather “[w]hat is at issue, instead, is 
whether petitioner should be considered a ‘party’ for the 
purposes of appealing.”).  Appellants therefore cannot pursue 
an appeal from Steven Halle’s individual judgment. 
 In Devlin, the Supreme Court concluded that an 
unnamed member of a Rule 23 class action who was affected 
by, and had objected to, the settlement of a class action during 
a hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure had the right, as a party to the action, to appeal the 
settlement without first filing a motion for leave to intervene.  
The Supreme Court held that “[w]hat is most important to this 
case is that nonnamed class members are parties to the 
                                              
16 Appellants did not actively participate in the proceeding at 
any time prior to their notice of appeal.  For example, when 
Steven Halle accepted judgment, Appellants did not move to 
intervene and substitute themselves as named plaintiffs in 
Steven Halle’s stead.  Thus, we need not consider whether 
such efforts might have been sufficient to keep the case 
“alive” for purposes of appealing the dismissal of the 
collective action allegations.  See, e.g., Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 
984-85 (discussing unsuccessful efforts of opt-in plaintiffs to 
intervene in decertified collective action after named 
plaintiffs’ claims were extinguished). 
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proceedings in the sense of being bound by the settlement.”  
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. 
 The opt-in plaintiffs here stand in contrast to the 
unnamed Rule 23 class member bound by a class action 
settlement as described in Devlin.  The opt-in plaintiffs were 
dismissed without prejudice when the collective action 
allegations were struck from the complaint and are not bound 
by any aspect of the judgment that was ultimately entered in 
Steven Halle’s case.  Consequently, they are not subject to a 
final decision disposing of their rights from which they may 
file an appeal under § 1291.  See id. at 14 (“[N]o federal 
statute or procedural rule directly addresses the question of 
who may appeal from approval of class action settlements, 
while the right to appeal from an action that finally disposes 
of one’s rights has a statutory basis.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 
1291)). 
 Even if, after Judge Bissoon dismissed the collective 
action allegations, Steven Halle retained some residual right 
to represent “similarly situated” employees, any such residual 
right does not extend to the opt-in plaintiffs.  The opt-in 
plaintiffs retained their own substantive FLSA claims and 
remain free to file such claims and pursue final judgments on 
the merits.  “While [a named plaintiff’s] settlement may have 
the collateral effect of foreclosing unjoined claimants from 
having their rights vindicated in respondent’s suit, such 
putative plaintiffs remain free to vindicate their rights in their 
own suits.  They are no less able to have their claims settled 
or adjudicated following respondent’s suit than if her suit has 
never been filed at all.”  Genesis Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 
1531. 
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 When the opt-in plaintiffs were dismissed without 
prejudice, they did not suffer an adverse judgment on the 
merits of any claim.  They lost nothing but the ability to 
proceed in Halle’s case.  This does not give rise to a right to 
pursue an appeal from Halle’s individual final judgment.  See 
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F2d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(where district court’s order does not affect a legally 
cognizable interest of appellant, appeal will be dismissed for 
lack of standing); In re: Glenn W. Turner Enter. Litig., 521 
F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975) (“A party may appeal only if he 
is aggrieved by the judgment or the order of the district 
court.”). 
 Our understanding of the representative nature of 
FLSA collective actions is consistent with our conclusion that 
the opt-in plaintiffs cannot pursue this appeal.  Steven Halle 
filed this proceeding, representing both himself and others 
“similarly situated.”  Halle alone litigated in that 
representational role: after filing the complaint, he raised and 
responded to motions, participated in alternative dispute 
resolution, and actively engaged in the litigation process.  The 
opt-in plaintiffs were mere passive observers until they were 
struck from the proceeding entirely. 
 When they opted to benefit from the efficiencies of 
participating in a collective action, these individuals agreed to 
set aside the individual authority to litigate, including the 
ability to appeal.  Each of the opt-in plaintiffs’ consent forms 
stated, “I hereby . . . authorize and designate the named 
plaintiffs to act on my behalf concerning the litigation, this 
investigation, consideration of settlement and attorneys’ fees 
and costs, and all other matters pertaining to this lawsuit.”  To 
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the extent that the Appellants could have appealed – and we 
hold above that they could not – this language waived their 
right to do so.  Cf. Prickett, 349 F.3d at 1297 (relying on “the 
language of the consent forms that the opt-in plaintiffs signed 
in this case” to determine which rights opt-in plaintiffs 
delegated to the named plaintiffs).  By consenting to join 
Halle’s collective action, these opt-in plaintiffs ceded to Halle 
the ability to act on their behalf in all matters, including the 
ability to pursue this appeal. 
D. 
 Appellants do not identify a single case in which a 
Court of Appeals has exercised jurisdiction over an appeal 
remotely similar to this one – in which a collective action opt-
in plaintiff seeks appellate review of a decision striking 
collective action allegations from a complaint and where the 
named plaintiff’s claims are moot.  Appellants are subject to a 
non-final order dismissing their claims without prejudice, and 
they offer no clear basis for the exercise of appellate 
jurisdiction.  Rather, they advocate that, as a matter of 
fairness, this Court should exercise jurisdiction over this 
appeal. 
 Appellants contend it would be unfair to dismiss this 
appeal because it leaves the opt-in plaintiffs without an 
opportunity to obtain appellate review of Judge Bissoon’s 
decision to dismiss the collective allegations from Halle’s 
complaint now that West Penn has “picked off” Halle by 
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offering him a Rule 68 judgment which mooted his claims.17  
It is true that we have observed the practical concern that the 
opt-in plaintiffs raise – namely, that offers of judgment, like 
the offer Halle accepted, are used by defendants to 
strategically “pick off” named plaintiffs prior to certification 
(or, here, appellate review of certification-related decisions), 
and may thereby result in the frustration of the collective 
action vehicle.  See Symczyk, 656 F.3d at 197-98. 
 When the Supreme Court considered this argument, 
the potential for unfairness did not affect its determination 
that, where the named plaintiff’s Rule 68 judgment mooted 
her claims, the Court was deprived of jurisdiction.  Genesis 
Healthcare, 133 S. Ct. at 1531.  Similarly here, fairness 
considerations do not undermine our fundamental conclusion 
that the opt-in plaintiffs lack a final decision that we may 
review under § 1291. 
 And any perceived unfairness is tempered by the fact 
that, in Camesi, the panel set forth a path for pursuing review 
of FLSA collective action certification decisions.  We here 
echo that point: to obtain appellate review of an order 
                                              
17 During oral argument, Appellants attempted to argue for 
the first time that an inability to obtain merits review in this 
appeal would amount to a deprivation of their constitutional 
right to due process.  “An appellant waives an argument in 
support of reversal if he does not raise that argument in his 
opening brief.”  AT & T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 495 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 562 
U.S. 397 (2011).  Because the constitutional claim was not 
presented in Appellants’ opening brief, it is waived. 
33 
 
decertifying a collective action, the plaintiff must either 
proceed to a final judgment on the merits of his or her 
individual claims or seek the District Court’s permission to 
pursue an immediate appeal.  Camesi, 729 F.3d at 245.  
Appellants have pursued neither course.  It should, therefore, 
be unsurprising that they face dismissal for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction over 
this appeal.  Accordingly, it will be dismissed. 
